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ARGUMENT
In responding to the brief filed by Plaintiff/Appellant Utah Coal and Lumber
Restaurant, Inc. ("Utah Coal"), Defendant/Appellee Outdoor Endeavors Unlimited dba
White Pine Touring ("White Pine"), the tenant in this case, has mischaracterized the
applicable law on appellate review of summary judgment, misstated both Utah Coal's
position and the facts before the trial court, and misread the controlling case law in this
matter, as well as much of the law from other jurisdictions.
POINT I:

ON APPEAL FROM A SUMMARY JUDGMENT, UTAH COAL HAS
THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE WHETHER WHITE PINE WAS
ENTITLED TO THAT JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.

White Pine attacks Utah Coal's argument that the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in this matter was in error. White Pine claims, among other things, that Utah Coal
has impermissibly raised "unpreserved claims." Utah Coal has done no such thing: Utah
Coal has appropriately challenged the trial court's ruling on the basis that neither the facts
before the trial court nor the law justified such relief, and that White Pine was not entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. The propriety of a summary judgment is always an issue that
is preserved on appeal. See, e.g., Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415 (Utah
App. 1994); Frisbee v. K& KConstruction Co., 676 P.2d 387 (Utah 1984); Rule 56, Ut. R.
Civ. P.
In Frisbee, a case involving the foreclosure of two trust deeds, this Court stated that
summary judgment "should be granted only when it clearly appears that there is no
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reasonable probability that the party moved against could prevail." Id. at 389 (citation
omitted). See also, Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1977). Furthermore,
because summary judgment is granted as a matter of law rather than fact, the appellate court
is free to "reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions." Barber v. Farmers Insurance
Exchange, 751 P.2d 248,251 (Utah App. 1988) (citation omitted). It is unquestionable that
in reviewing cases involving summary judgment,
an appellate court applies the same standard as that applied by the trial court....
"We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the losing party, and
affirm only where it appears there is no genuine dispute as to any material
issues of fact, or where, even according to the facts as contended by the losing
party, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." ...[W]e
will independently look at the facts properly before the trial court and decide
whether any material facts are in dispute.
Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 and n.5 (Utah 1987)(citing Durham v. Magetts,
571P.2d 1334; quoting Themy v. Seagull Enterprises, Inc., 595 P.2d 526, 528-29 (Utah
1979)) (emphasis in original). Based on established principles of appellate review, Utah
Coal is perfectly justified in putting the propriety of the summary judgment before this
Court.
White Pine has also argued that Utah Coal admitted certain facts White Pine asserted
below by responding with statements to the effect that such "facts" were disputed to the
extent that the record did not support them, and/or they were simply unsupported allegations.
See, Appellee's Brief at 8 n.3. If, however, the moving party simply presents conclusions
without factual support, so that the party is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
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that issue, the non-moving party has no obligation to provide evidence that raises a question
of fact. See, Frisbee, 676 P.2d 387, 389-90. Where the record does not support White
Pine's allegations, Utah Coal's responsibility is satisfied by merely pointing out the
deficiency of the evidence.
In this case, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Utah Coal's
motion was based on the theory that the Lease agreement clearly required that written notice
be provided within a certain period in order to exercise the option to renew. White Pine's
theory was, in contrast, based on an equitable defense to the operation and enforcement of
the Lease according to its terms. Although summary judgment can be granted where no
issues of material fact exist and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the fact
that cross-motions have been filed does not necessarily mean that there is an absence of
issues of material fact, or that a judgment one way or the other is appropriate based on the
absence of issues of material fact. DeStefano v. Oregon Mutual Insurance Co., 762 P.2d
1123, 1124 (Utah App. 1988). "'[B]y the filing of a motion a party concedes that no issue
of material fact exists under the theory he is advancing, but he does not thereby so concede
that no issues remain in the event his adversary's theory is adopted.'" DeStefano, 762 P.2d
at 1124 (quoting Nafco Oil and Gas, Inc. v. Appelman, 380 F.2d 323,325 (10th Cir. 1967)).
See also, Amjacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design Associates, et. aL, 635 P.2d 53, 55 (Utah
1981)(cross-motions do not necessarily dissipate factual issues and one party's concessions
for purposes of its motion does not extend to support the other party's motion)(relying on
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6 Moore's Federal Practice ^56.13 at 341-344 (2nd ed. 1976)). Thus, even assuming for
purposes of argument only, that some facts may have been conceded under Utah Coal's legal
theory, such concessions did not cross over to support White Pine's equitable argument for
relief.
POINT II:

WHITE PINE'S STATEMENT OF PURPORTED FACTS MISSTATES
WHAT WAS PRESENTED TO THE COURT BELOW

In White Pine's effort to depict itself as an innocent, generous and trusting tenant
which has fallen prey to an avaricious and predatory landlord, White Pine has distorted
numerous facts and simply ignored others in a selective and subjective characterization of
the Record. The discussion below identifies only White Pine's most egregious liberties with
the actual facts as disclosed by the evidence.
1.

The Term of the Lease. White Pine persists in mischaracterizing the Lease as

"long-term" or one of 20 years.1 As the language on the first page of the Lease clearly
states, the Lease is a 5-year lease with three 5-year options to renew. R.14.
2.

The Nature of White Pine's Failure. White Pine's discussion of its failure to

provide the required notice to Utah Coal is based on three serious errors. The first two

*By way of example only: (1) "White Pine insisted on and ultimately obtained a
long-term lease" (Appellee's Brief, at 2); (2) "White Pine leased the Building for a
total of twenty years" (Brief at 3); (3) "The full 20 year term of the Lease" (Brief at
3); (4) "The Lease's full 20-year term" (Brief at 19); and, (5) "The Lease's 20-year
term" (Brief at 24). White Pine also calls the Lease's options to renew mere
"extensions" (Brief at 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9). The use of the term "extension", however,
does not excuse or diminish White Pine's failure to diligently appreciate and discharge
the requirements imposed by the Lease for exercising the options to renew.
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involve White Pine's purported "distractions," and the third involves White Pine's argument
regarding the Certificate of Occupancy issued by Park City Building Department.
First, White Pine continues to depict its failure to comply with the Lease as the
unfortunate consequence of various alleged distractions that arose during the notice period.
However, Ms. Sturgis' statement that "she honestly missed it" is an admission that she
"missed" White Pine's obligation to give notice, not the specifics as to when or how the
Lease required notice to be given (Appellant's Brief at 6-8). White Pine's reliance on the
alleged distractions to try to justify its failure is irrelevant. One can hardly claim to have
been "distracted" from discharging an obligation not recognized to exist.2
Second, White Pine has failed to explain, to either this Court or the trial court, how
the evidence proves that the alleged distractions operated to prevent White Pinefromgiving
notice during the entire 60 day period of the notice window. This point was specifically
raised before the trial court. (Tr.12, R.1082)
Third, White Pine also persists in attaching legal significance to the fact that Utah
Coal took the trouble to learn when Park City issued the Certificate of Occupancy for the
Building for purposes of the Lease "Commencement Date," but did not share that
information with White Pine. However, White Pine has not suggested that it was any less

2

Utah Coal's opening brief at 8 points out that Ms. Sturgis was offended that in
1998, Utah Coal attempted to enforce what she considered to be the petty requirement
of written notice which, in her view, was not how things were done in 1993 in Park
City. In 1999, she still did not see it as her "problem" that Utah Coal took a less
relaxed view of the parties' contractual obligations than White Pine did (R.251-252).
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able than Utah Coal to obtain this information, and, as the court below acknowledged, Utah
Coal had no obligation to apprise White Pine of its obligations under the Lease (R.745,
1121, (Tr.51), R.1124 (Tr.54)). Had White Pine exercised any diligence with respect to its
notice obligation under the Lease, White Pine could have calculated the notice window by
relying on the September 1 anniversary date of the prior rent increase under the Lease
(R.202), or the earlier date of August 26, on which White Pine first conducted business in
the Utah Coal Building (R.173). The evidence is indisputable that White Pine made no
effort whatsoever to ascertain its notice obligations.
3.

White Pine's Alleged Forfeiture. As Utah Coal discussed in its opening brief,

White Pine's evidence clearly shows that White Pine believes its business cannot survive if
the Lease is not renewed because of its inability to pay a market-rate rent and to survive
without the insulation from ordinary market forces that the Lease provides. (R.562).3 Rather
than emphasize that position, for which relief might not be forthcoming, White Pine claimed
that it would forfeit its $105,000.00 investment in "permanent" improvements to the
Building.
In its brief before this Court, however, White Pine focuses on its alleged $148,000
"investment in the Building"(Appellee's Brief at 5,8), obscuring the following critical facts:

3

In White Pine's Reply Memorandum to the trial court, White Pine argues that
the improvements were made "in return for a 20-year lease" and that it is "the lease,
not the monetary investment [that] White Pine must preserve in order to survive.
Simply recouping its out-of-pocket cost would not alleviate White Pine's irreparable
harm." (R.722, n.2).
-6-

(1) Over $40,000 of that sum was not invested in the Building itself, which White Pine
concedes in its brief (Appellee's Brief at 5); and (2) White Pine's evidence of 1993
expenditures on improvements is not evidence of the loss it would actually incur because it
has had five years' use of and benefitfromthe improvements. Apparently for that reason,
White Pine now places great emphasis on its alleged need to occupy the building for 20
years in order to "recoup" its investment by depreciating the investment over that period of
time (Appellee's Brief at 3). Although in its Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Cross
Motion for Summary Judgment, White Pine made an occasional vague reference to White
Pine's belief that it would have 20 years to "recover" its investment, White Pine never spoke
in terms of recouping it through depreciation. By doing so now, White Pine has implicitly
conceded that it has already "recouped" some portion of its investment.
The implicit concession does not improve White Pine's position, since it also
highlights White Pine's failure to quantify the allegedly "unrecouped" portion of its
$ 105,000 investment in "permanent" improvements. Furthermore, now that White Pine has
suddenly brought the "recoupment" argument to the forefront, it would only be fair to
consider that the lower rent paid by White Pine during the first two years of the Lease
($33,000 annually, as compared to $50,500 each year in the third, fourth and fifth years;
R.13-14), was a method by which White Pine was able to very quickly "recoup"
approximately $35,000, which is a significant portion of its investment.
4.

The Alleged Expectations of the Parties. White Pine claims that, in 1993 and
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later, Utah Coal knew of White Pine's "need" to occupy the Building for 20 years and
always expected White Pine to do so (Appellee's Brief at 5). The evidence reflects,
however, nothing more than that White Pine claims that Utah Coal shared White Pine's
alleged expectation in this regard, rather than demonstrating that Utah Coal actually did.4
Moreover, White Pine's alleged state of mind in 1993 is of only dubious legal relevance,
since White Pine's intent at that time neither altered its contractual obligations in 1998, nor
guaranteed that White Pine would not have changed its mind by 1998.
POINT III: THE LAW OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS ARGUES AGAINST
AFFIRMING RELIEF TO WHITE PINE ON THE THEORY OF
EQUITABLE EXCUSE.
White Pine's discussion of other states' law regarding the availability of equitable
excuse and White Pine's application of its version of that law to the facts of this case simply
ignores the fact that other states' approaches to applying the doctrine of equitable excuse not

4

The evidence cited by White Pine consists of (1) allegations in its Counterclaim
(R.73-75), which White Pine fails to note were denied in Utah Coal's Answer (R.119120); (2) deposition testimony of Kathy Sturgis that does not address what Utah Coal
knew, but instead discusses why White Pine wanted to lease the Building and why Ms.
Sturgis still believes White Pine obtained a 20-year lease (R.250-254); and, (3)
deposition testimony of Jim Powell and Nick Powell that confirms that White Pine had
wanted a long-term lease, among many other things, and that the Powells would have
been surprised if White Pine did not want to renew the Lease. (R.278, 275, 515-516,
535, 543, 547-548). White Pine's two other citations to the Record are to its alleged
"Undisputed Facts" (R.594), which mischaracterize the foregoing evidence in the same
fashion as White Pine does on appeal, and to Utah Coal's Responses to the allegedly
Undisputed Facts (R.706), which quite properly disputed Ihem to the extent that the
cited portions of the record before the trial court did not establish the facts alleged by
White Pine, and then refutes White Pine's characterization of Utah Coal's expectations.
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only fail to uniformly provide support for the summary judgment awarded to White Pine5
but, in many instances, underscore the errors of the trial court's ruling. White Pine's
discussion of the law of other jurisdictions often disregards the facts before the various
courts or considerations critical to their analyses. According to White Pine, nothing worthy
of note in American jurisprudence stands between White Pine and relief from its failure to
both recognize and discharge its obligations under the unambiguous language of the Lease's
option to renew. White Pine is wrong.
A.

Several of the Cases Cited by White Pine Deny Relief to a Negligent Tenant
White Pine obscures the fact that a number of the decisions it cites, but never really

discusses, deny relief to a tenant whose predicament is entirely due to its own unjustifiable
negligence. For example, in the second half of Footnote 7, White Pine lists 13 cases from
13 jurisdictions which, according to White Pine, recognize the availability of the doctrine
of equitable excuse "but have yet to find appropriate circumstances that would warrant its
application" (Appellee's Brief, n.7 at 16-18, ).5
A careful reading of a number of these cases, however, reveals that White Pine's
predicament would not be viewed as "appropriate circumstances" warranting equitable
relief. For example, in citing Carsten v. Eickhoff, 323 N.E.2d 664,669 (Ind.Ct.App. 1975),
White Pine failed to disclose that the Indiana Supreme Court decision on which Carsten

5

Most of the cases cited in the first half of Footnote 7 were relied on by White
Pine below and distinguished by Utah Coal in its opening brief. A few of the newly
cited cases are also distinguishable; the rest add nothing to White Pine's argument.
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relies, Thieband v. The First National Bank of Vevay, 42 Ind. 212, 1873 WL 5204 at [6],
unambiguously precludes relief for a tenant like White Pine, which the Thieband court
would view as guilty of "willful ignorance":
[W]here a person neglects the means of information which
ordinary prudence would suggest; and it is clear that ignorance
of a man's own rights, conferred by an instrument actually in
his possession or power, where the other party is consequently
innocent of concealment, or of any conduct to keep him
ignorant of its contents, cannot excuse the performance of any
conditions imposed on the person claiming under the
instrument. [Citation.]
See also, 33 Flavors Stores v. Hoffman's Candies, Inc., 370 S.E.2d 293, 295 (S.C.App.
1988) (reversing trial court in part on the ground that the failure of the subtenant to renew
was its "sole fault," noting the absence of any "special circumstances" warranting relief,
since nothing in the record indicated that the subtenant's failure "was due to any misleading
representation or conduct" by the landlord); Greenhill Investment Co. v. Tabet, 1986
Del.Ch.LEXIS 480 at [16] [17] (1986) (no relief for the tenant, since the traditional rule
prohibits equitable relief for tenants' negligence, and the alternative rule bars relief for
inexcusable neglect of tenant, who was an experienced business man, as well as other
equitable factors); Koch v. H & SDevelopment Co., 163 So.2d 710, 727-28 (Miss. 1964)
("equity will not relieve against mere forgetfiilness and will not intervene where there is no
fraud, accident or mistake on account of which the lessee neglected to avail himself of the
option"); McClellan v. Ashley, 200 Va. 38,40,43; 104 S.E.2d 55 (Va. 1958) ("sympathy is
not a ground for equitable relief," and a tenant is "not entitled to be rescued by a court of
-10-

equity from the consequences of his negligence"); Medomak Canning Co. v. York, 143 Me.
190, 197, 57 A.2d 745 (Me. 1948) ("equity cannot aid lessee to avoid the natural and
reasonable consequences of its own negligence, to which lessor in no way contributed");
Simons v. Young, 93 Cal.App3d 170,189,155 CaLRptr. 460 (Cal.Ct.App. 1979) (adopting
the rule set forth in Koch and McClellan, holding that "equity will not relieve against mere
forgetfulness," as distinguished from "fraud, accident or mistake"); Trueman-Aspen Co. v.
Northmill Investment Corp., 728 P.2d 343, 344 (Colo.App. 1986) (tenant's failure
"admittedly caused by its own carelessness" and record "reveals no facts or special
circumstances which might have prevented or hindered [tenant's] timely exercise of its
option to renew the lease").
B.

White Pine Fails to Appropriately Identify Cases it Cites in Which Special
Circumstances Reasonably Explained the Tenant's Error.
White Pine refuses to recognize that various jurisdictions have conditioned a grant

of relief to a negligent or careless tenant on facts that revealed a reasonable explanation for
the tenant's failure or negligence. White Pine simply ignores or dismisses this feature of
these courts' analysis. Thus, for example, in Duncan v. G.E.W., Inc., 526 A.2d 1358
(D.C.Ct.App. 1987), the court discussed at some length the tenant's understandable,
although ultimately incorrect, interpretation ofthe lease as requiring 30, rather than 90, days'
written notice to exercise the option to renew. The tenant was clearly not indifferent to its
obligation under the option provision and had made "reminder" calendar entries consistent
with its mistaken interpretation of the notice requirement. The Duncan court took pains to
-11-

distinguish this "honest mistake" from "mere neglect/' noting that had the tenant been guilty
of the latter, the court "would be far less inclined to rule in [the tenant's] favor." 526 A.2d
at 1364 and n. 8.
In Fletcher v. Frisbee, 404 A.2d 1106 (N.H. 1979), the court viewed the tenant's
failure as resulting from "an accident or honest mistake," since the tenant itself had not been
negligent and had asked its attorney to exercise the option to renew before the option had
expired, but the attorney had failed to do so until five or six days after the option had lapsed.
Later, In Re Millyard Restaurant, 110 B.R. 103 (D.N.H. 1990), applied New Hampshire law
as articulated in Fletcher, finding that the tenant's failure was due to either negligence or a
desire to "straddle" the market, as distinguished from the honest mistake of the Fletcher
tenant. On that basis, Millyard denied relief to the tenant, and noted that, "obviously a
simple 'didn't think of it' excuse cannot suffice or the [Fletcher] exception would eat up the
rule." 110 B.R. at 105.
Several of the cases cited by White Pine for the first time in this appeal only confirm
the importance of the quality of the tenant's conduct in failing to strictly comply with its
notice obligations. In Bennetti v. Kishner, 558 P.2d 537 (Nev. 1977), the court reversed a
grant of summary judgment in favor of the landlord, but did not enter a judgment in favor
of the tenant, and remanded the case for a trial of the factual question of whether equity
should intervene where the tenant had misunderstood the effect of an addendum to the
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original lease.6 Similarly, in Inn of the Hills, Ltd. v. Shulgen & Kaiser, 723 S.W.2d 299,301
(Tex.Ct.App. 1987), a tenant obtained relief from its own negligence because of, among
other things, its reliance on a mischaracterization of the remaining term of the lease in the
documents by which it had taken an assignment of that lease just a few years before. On that
basis, the court concluded that the tenant had not been "grossly negligent." In a comparable
vein, the court in Ward v. Washington Distributors, Inc., 425 N.E.2d 420, 423 (Ohio App.
1980), cited by White Pine in the first half of Footnote 7, was willing to provide equitable
relief to a tenant who had made an "honest, good faith mistake" as to when (not whether)
notice was due, by relying on a digest of the lease which misled the tenant as to the date
from which the notice period was to be calculated.7
C.

White Pine Refuses to Acknowledge that a Landlord's Unfair Conduct is a
Factor that Shifts the Balance in Favor of a Tenant
Notwithstanding White Pine's claim to the contrary, the nexus between the character

or quality of the tenant's conduct and questionable behavior by the landlord is often critical.

6

In citing Benetti, White Pine failed to disclose that, just one year later, the
Nevada Supreme Court denied relief to a tenant who had "overlooked" the timely
exercise of its option to renew, holding that, "equity will not intervene to protect a
lessee from its own negligent failure to give the required written notice." Host
International Inc. v. Summa Corp., 583 P.2d 1080, 1082 (Nev. 1978) (citing
Medomak, supra, I.X.L., infra, and also citing Benetti as an example of "special
circumstances" which may warrant relief).
7

Ward also stands for the proposition that a tenant's prospective loss should be
evaluated in terms of the unamortized value of improvements. See also, F.B. Fountain
v. Stein, 118 A. 47, 50 (Conn. 1922), another case cited by White Pine in the first half
of Footnote 7.
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For example, in Gardner v. H.K.T. Realty Corp., 744 S.W.2d 735 (Ark.Ct.App. 1988), at
the time notice of renewal was due, the tenant was engaged in settlement negotiations with
its landlord relating to pending litigation regarding prior breaches of the lease by the
landlord and/or its predecessor. The court accepted the tenant's explanation that it had
refrainedfromexercising its option to renew because the tenant was concerned that it might
prejudice its rights, and that the landlord was acting in bad faith. Considerations of a similar
nature entered into the analyses of the courts in several of the cases relied upon by White
Pine in the summary judgment proceedings below and again in its brief to this Court.8
D.

White Pine Ignores Consideration of the Full Scope of Landlord Harm.
A number of courts have considered it only fair to analyze the question of potential

prejudice to both parties on a prospective basis, rather than limiting the landlord to arguing
whether or not the length of delay in receiving notice had caused the landlord any prejudice.
White Pine simply disregards this consideration in a number of the cases on which it relies
below.9 For example, in citing Greenhill Investment Co. v. Tabet, 1986 Del.Ch.LEXIS 480

8

Also see the discussion of J.N. A. Realty Corp. v. Cross Bay Chelsea, Inc., 366
N.E.2d 1313 (N.Y. 1977); Linn v. LaSalle National Bank, 424 N.E.2d 676 (Ill.App.
1981); Trollen v. City of Wabasha, 287 N.W.2d 645 (Minn. 1979); Wharf Restaurant,
Inc. v. Port of Seattle, 605 P.2d 334 (Wash.Ct.App. 1979), in Utah Coal's opening
brief at 23, n. 11.
9

As noted in Utah Coal's opening brief at 42-43, several of the decisions relied
upon by White Pine below, and now before this Court, made it clear that the fact that
the landlord would not be forced to accept a below-market rent upon a renewal was an
important consideration in the decision to grant relief. Fletcher v. Frisbee, 404 A.2d
1106 (N.H. 1979); Trollen v. City of Wabasha, 287 N.W.2d 645 (Minn. 1979); Wharf
44-

at [16] [17] (1986), White Pine ignores that court's clear conviction that, even under the
most generous analysis available to a tenant, relief would be precluded because that landlord
would be forced to continue to accept a rent well below what the market would dictate. In
Niagara Frontier Services, Inc. v. Thress, 487 N.Y.S.2d 228, 229 (N.Y.App. 1985), the
court appeared willing, in principle, to consider a landlord's prospective prejudice, but
viewed the proof offered by the landlord as insufficient by evidentiary standards.
In this case, the evidence establishes that Utah Coal will be forced to accept a belowmarket rent if the Lease is deemed renewed. Not only did Utah Coal offer proof as to what
the market rate would be (R. 155-158,676-677), which White Pine disputed, but White Pine
itself concedes that it cannot afford to pay a market-rate rent (R.562), which is an admission
that the rent White Pine pays under the Lease is below the market rate.
Thus, a fair reading of the authorities offered by White Pine paints a far different
picture from the one that White Pine suggests. While it is probably true that White Pine
would stand a chance of prevailing if this case were pending in, for example, New York or
Connecticut, it is equally clear that it would stand no chance at all in many other
jurisdictions, including many it commends to this Court. Given the judicial philosophy of
this Court, as illuminated by the decisions in I.X.L. Furniture & Carpet Installment House
v. Berets, 32 Utah 454, 91 P. 279 (1907), and Geisdorfv. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67 (Utah
1998), the circumstances of this case weigh against the intervention of equity to afford relief

Restaurant, Inc. v. Port of Seattle, 605 P.2d 334 (Wash.App. 1979).
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to White Pine. Indeed, this Court can, and should, direct entry ofjudgment in favor of Utah
Coal, confident that both the law of Utah and that of numerous other states support such a
disposition.

POINT IV: UTAH CASE LAW DICTATES THAT EQUITABLE EXCUSE IS NOT
AVAILABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
Despite White Pine's numerous statements to the contrary, Utah Coal has not taken
a position "which would reject the doctrine [of equitable excuse] entirely" or suggested that
equitable excuse is not available under Utah law. Furthermore, Utah Coal reads neither
I.X.L. Furniture & Carpet Installment House v. Berets, 32 Utah 454, 91 P. 279 (1907), nor
Geisdorfv. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67 (Utah 1998), as rejecting the doctrine of equitable excuse.
Both cases acknowledge equitable excuse and its availability under certain circumstances.
What Utah Coal does reject, however, is the notion that such circumstances exist in this case.
The question before this Court is not whether Utah recognizes a doctrine of equitable
excuse, but rather, on what basis equitable excuse will be considered or granted. As White
Pine admits, the doctrine of equitable excuse is a narrow exception to the otherwise
established law, which requires strict compliance in the exercise of an option. Utah law
provides for an exception to that rule, but only in certain "special circumstances."
We uphold the rule of law that barring special circumstances such as
misrepresentation or waiver, exercise of an option must be made strictly in
accordance with its terms.
Geisdorfv. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 74 (Utah 1998).
In this case, however, White Pine would have the Court vastly expand this
-16-

supposedly narrow exception and rule, for the first time, that such special circumstances
exist when a tenant has failed to timely exercise its option to renew its lease through
inadvertence, has made improvements to the leased premises, and the landlord has not yet
rented the property to another tenant. There is, however, nothing particularly remarkable
about those circumstances; in fact, it appears that they occur ratherfrequently,see Brief of
Appellee at 15-17, n.7, and there is certainly nothing of such import as to require this Court
to change law that has existed for almost a century. See, I.X.L. Furniture Carpet
Installment House v. Berets, 32 Utah 454, 91 P. 279 (1907).
White Pine is so anxious to establish the availability of an equitable excuse that it
ignores controlling Utah law and urges this Court to adopt standards under which White
Pine insists this case must be decided, even though Utah law has never recognized such
standards, despite ample opportunity to do so. The standards that White Pine demands, in
which hardship to the tenant takes precedence over virtually every other consideration, are
nowhere set forth in existing Utah law.
In its brief, White Pine expounds on the doctrine of equitable excuse, but presents no
reasonable basis as to why Utah should adopt new standards for granting an equitable excuse
in cases involving lease renewal options. White Pine's only reason appears to be that a
number of other states have adopted the pro-tenant standards, although certainly not as many
jurisdictions as White Pine would have the Court believe. White Pine argues that its
approach is "more modem" because, it claims, more of the most recent cases appear to apply
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a lenient, pro-tenant test. It should not be particularly surprising, however, that there has
been more recent litigation in the jurisdictions which require the court to determine and
weigh hardship to the tenant versus the cause of the tenant's failure to timely exercise its
option, as well as the extent and the result of delay in such exercise. The more lenient and
fact-laden test results in a proliferation of litigation as more and more litigants seek to
expand the limits of the test. In the jurisdictions in which atpplication of equitable excuse
is historically more limited, litigation on this issue has not proliferated as it has in
jurisdictions taking the so-called "more modern" approach.
Utah made its choice and settled the lease renewal option issue in 1907 in I.X.L.
Furniture Carpet Installment House v. Berets, 32 Utah 454, 91 P. 279 (1907). In/.XL,
the tenant failed to exercise its option within the strict notice limitations of the option
agreement due to inadvertence. The tenant had made improvements to the property, and
alleged that it had established goodwill at the location. The landlord had not suffered any
detriment or change of position due to the one or two day delay in the tenant's providing
notice. When the landlord refused to renew the lease, the tenant filed an action seeking
specific performance of the renewal option. Id. at 279-280 The Utah Supreme Court held
that the option had not been exercised in strict compliance with its terms, that the facts did
not provide an equitable excuse, and that the tenant had suffered no "forfeiture," but instead
had "simply lost the right to a renewal of a new term." Id. at 283. Thus, in I.X.L., the Court
expressly considered the applicability of an equitable excuse under such circumstances and
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flatly rejected it.
The facts in this case are virtually identical to those in I.X.L.. White Pine's attempt
to distinguish I.X.L. is entirely without merit. Nothing in the LXL. opinion supports White
Pine's assertions that the tenant's improvements were only "minimal at best," Appellee's
Brief at 13, n. 4, or that the Court failed to consider the tenant's improvements.
Furthermore, White Pine is equally wrong in contending that the tenant only alleged
inadvertence, rather than inadvertence in conjunction with tenant hardship and lack of
landlord hardship. As a matter of fact, the tenant in LX.L specifically alleged that it had
made improvements to the premises, as well as having established good will, and that the
landlord would not suffer prejudice. Id. at 279-80. The Court, however, did not relent.
White Pine's purported distinction between the cost of the improvements made by
the tenant, LX.L. Furniture and Carpet Installment House ("IXL"), and those made by White
Pine is wholly unpersuasive. White Pine's dismissal of the $750 spent by IXL in 1907 by
comparing that amount in absolute terms to the $105,000 White Pine spent in 1993 is
simplistic. A more realistic comparison of the numbers involved quickly dispels White
Pine's basis for distinguishing LXL. from this case.
Even without a precise basis for comparison, it is possible to establish a reasonable
comparison by viewing the respective costs of improvements asfractionsof the total rent
obligations over the maximum duration of the lease in each case. On that basis, IXL's
expenditure exceeded White Pine's expenditure by twenty-five percent, because the $750
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amounts to 12.5% of IXL's maximum rent obligation.10 White Pine's expenditure of
$105,000, however, would amount to less than 10% of an estimated maximum rent
obligation of approximately $1,165,000. * * Even if the numbers are only compared based
on the initial lease term rents, White Pine's improvements cost represents 48.3% of its initial
lease term rent, whereas IXL's improvements cost constitutes 31.3%, which is less than
White Pine's cost, but hardly "minimal."
Based on this adjusted analysis, it becomes evident that the I.X.L. case is directly on
point, and, therefore, controlling. Unless this Court wishes to overrule I.X.L., there is no
need to look to the multitude of casesfromother jurisdictions that White Pine has presented
in its attempt to overcome its failure to strictly comply with its lease renewal option.
POINT V:

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS, INCLUDING THE LIKELY
PROLIFERATION OF LITIGATION AND THE RESULTING
UNCERTAINTY, COMPEL THIS COURT TO DENY RELIEF TO
WHITE PINE.

White Pine asks this Court to adopt the law of certain other jurisdictions in which a
tenant's negligence is accepted so that the court simply undertakes a balancing of the factual

10

In I.X.L., the tenant paid $750 for improvements, which White Pine claimed
to be minimal. IXL's original lease was for two years at $100 per month, or $2,400
for the initial term. The renewal term was to have been for 3 years at the same rent, or
$3,600, for a maximum total rent of $6,000. IXL's improvement cost is derived by
dividing $750 by $6,000, which amounts to a 12.5% cost for improvements.
11

If the Lease is deemed renewed, White Pine would pay nearly $502,000 over
its first 10 years; assuming the same increases at the beginning of the second and third
option periods as in Year 6, White Pine would pay at least $663,000 for Years 11
through 20. (R. 13-14; Appellant's Brief at 5).
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circumstances to determine where the equities lie. The trial court opted to accept White
Pine's argument and those cases. However, by denying relief to Utah Coal on this record, the
trial court's ruling raises far more substantial policy implications than White Pine would ever
admit.
There are obvious problems associated with a procedure which requires a court to
determine in each case: what constitutes an honest and justifiable mistake and whether the
tenant's conduct satisfies that standard; what and how much harm the tenant would suffer if
forced to live by the terms of the option; whether the delay in providing the required notice
was short, moderately long or extensive; what caused the tenant to delay; what harm the
landlord suffered strictly as a direct result of the delay, and on that basis, or perhaps other
factors, whether the tenant deserves equitable relief from the requirements of its contract.
The most clearly evident problem is that the standards are all extremely flexible and,
therefore, will have to be considered on a case by case basis. Although such treatment may
make sense in certain areas of the law, such as domestic relations, case by case analysis is
far less appropriate in commercial rental settings governed by contracts executed in arms'
length transactions. In such settings, a business is generally expected to manage its
contractual obligations sufficiently well to meet notice deadlines, or else suffer the
consequences.
Furthermore, the flexibility of the factual standards proposed by White Pine simply
invites litigation, which, as noted above, may be why there appear to be so many cases of
record that involve the process of balancing of equities. Limiting the application of equitable
-21-

excuse to cases in which there has been 1) inequitable conduct, such as misrepresentation or
interference, 2) waiver or 3) some unavoidable or truly accidental intervening circumstance,
reduces the circumstances in which a failure will be litigated. Similarly, as noted in Utah
Coal's opening brief, the standard of honest and justifiable mistake, as set by the trial court,
in which anything that is not gross negligence or willful conduct fits within the supposedly
narrow exception, is overly broad and inclusive: virtually every missed deadline could
conceivably be classified as an honest and justifiable mistake such that the renewal
requirement would become virtually meaningless.
Another problem inherent in White Pine's analysis is that it inequitably favors the
tenant, at the expense of the landlord's property rights, by elevating the negligent tenant's
alleged economic interests above those of the landlord that is forced to accept below-market
rent. Thus, White Pine's argument completely fails to consider the landlord's rights.
White Pine's analysis provides that the only harm to a landlord that may be considered
is whether or not the landlord was able to secure a new tenant during the period of delay in
receiving notice of the tenant's exercise of its option to renew. Based on commercial
landlord-tenant realities, it is highly unlikely that a landlord could seal a transaction with a
new tenant when the old tenant remains on the premises and asserts that it is entitled to stay
for the lease renewal term. What is more likely is that the landlord would be sued for
specific performance and the prospective tenant would be sued for intentional interference
with contract.
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Finally, the most critical defect in the analysis that White Pine demands is the
inevitable sacrifice of certainty and predictability in contractual matters involving
commercial leases containing renewal options. For that reason, commercial landlords may
just eliminate renewal option provisions in their leases. The irony of that result is that a lease
renewal option, as opposed to a long-term lease commitment, clearly favors the tenant,
because the option offers the tenant an escape from long term liability in the event that the
tenant's business is not successful or a market downturn results in lower rents. In the current
inflationary market of pre-Olympic Park City, White Pine has forgotten that rents can go
down, businesses can fail, commercial credit can become unavailable or other circumstances
can change, making the opportunity to be released from liability at the end of a short lease
term very favorable to a tenant. If the enforcement of option requirements becomes
unpredictable, and litigation becomes the only means to enforce them, landlords will lose any
incentive to include such provisions in their commercial leases, to the tenant's detriment.
There is nothing wrong with revisiting existing law. White Pine's position in this
matter, however, appears to imply that the standards White Pine proposes have already been
adopted in Utah. They have not. Geisdorfv. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67 (Utah 1998), certainly
refers to equitable excuse and "honest and justifiable mistake," but never mentions the
elements White Pine proposes. Similarly, nowhere in LX.L. does the Court set forth the
standards for relief on which White Pine relies. See, Appellee's Brief at 10-11. Most
significantly, however, LX.L. clearly holds that tenant "forfeiture," the primary element of
White Pine's argument in this case, is not an element to be considered as part of the loss of
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an option to renew a lease. 91 P. 283.
In Guy Dean's Lake Shore Marina v. Ramey, 518 N.W.2d 129,246 Neb. 258 (1994),
the Nebraska Supreme Court considered circumstances that closely resemble White Pine's
situation in this case. At the end of its initial twenty-five year lease term, the tenant, which
had made "substantial improvements" to the property, failed to exercise its option to renew
its lease for the first of two twenty-five year renewal terms. The landlord notified the tenant,
on July 21,1992, that the option period had expired on July 1. The tenant immediately orally
notified the landlord of the tenant's intent to renew, and the next day, on July 22,1992, the
tenant gave written notice. The tenant argued that its three week delay was an "honest
mistake," and that if it were not excused, the tenant would suffer "unconscionable harm,"
because the improvements would revert to the landlord if the lease terminated at that point.
518 N.W. 2d at 131. Having considered many of the same cases on which White Pine relies,
and finding no basis on which to depart from precedent, the Nebraska Supreme Court
declined the tenant's invitation to change Nebraska's long-standing rule requiring strict
compliance with options. This Court should do the same.
CONCLUSION
Utah Coal seeks the reversal of the trial court's summary judgment, and a grant of
summary judgment in favor of Utah Coal based on the record and on established Utah law.
If this Court were to deny relief to Utah Coal and permit White Pine to be equitably excused
from strict compliance with the option requirement under the facts of this case, the Court
would not only be implementing new law in place of law that Utah has relied upon for almost
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a century, but would, in effect, be converting an option to renew into an option to terminate,
rewarding the lack of commercial diligence and undermining the predictability of contract.
None of those results is legally or commercially desirable. This Court should reverse the trial
court's ruling and enter summary judgment in favor of Utah Coal.
Dated this 4th day of April, 2001.

Janet A. Goldstein
Attorney for Plaintiff7Appellant
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